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DRONES AND TRANSNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS
Michael W. Lewis *
Drones are certainly one of the most discussed features
of the ongoing conflict between the United States and al Qaeda,
and in many ways they are one of the most misunderstood. To
some they represent a step towards a dystopian future in which
Terminator-like machines relentlessly hunt down human
beings. 1 Others have criticized drones for causing civilian
casualties, 2 for violating the sovereignty of nations not directly
involved in the conflict, 3 for increasing the support for al
Qaeda amongst the civilian population , 4 and for bringing a
“video-game” mentality to warfare. 5 Drone strikes are viewed
*

Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law. I would
like to thank the members of the St. John’s Journal of International and Comparative
Law for creating an excellent Symposium to discuss the legality and policy
considerations underlying the use of armed drones. I would also like to thank the
participants at the symposium for their comments and suggestions concerning this
essay. In discussing the capabilities, limitations and near term uses of drones I draw
upon my experience flying F-14’s for the U.S. Navy during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
1
See Peter Finn, A Future for Drones: Automated Killing, WASHINGTON POST
(Sep. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/a-futurefor-drones-automatedkilling/2011/09/15/gIQAVy9mgK_story.html?wpisrc=emailtoafriend; see also David
Luban, What Would Augustine Do? The President, Drones and Just War Theory,
BOSTON REVIEW (June 6, 2012),
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.3/david_luban_obama_drones_just_war_theory.ph
p.
2
See US Drone Strikes ‘Raise Questions’ – UN’s Navi Pillay, BBC NEWS ASIA
(June 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18363003.
3
Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (Apr. 28, 2010) (statement of Mary Ellen O’Connell,
Professor, University of Notre Dame)[hereinafter O’Connell testimony]; see also LA
Times Editorial Board, A Closer Look at Drones, LA TIMES (Sep. 25, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/25/opinion/la-ed-drones-20110925.
4
See Sudarsan Raghavan, In Yemen, US Airstrikes Breed Anger, and Sympathy
for al Qaeda, WASHINGTON POST (May 29, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breedanger-and-sympathy-for-al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html.
5
See Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions, ¶84, UN Doc. HRC/14/24/Add. 6, (May 28, 2010),
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negatively by the general populations of most nations surveyed
in a recent poll by Pew Research, 6 and some jurists have gone
so far as to suggest that their use should be banned entirely,
comparing them to cluster munitions and landmines. 7 Yet in
spite of all these supposed faults drones have been used with
increasing frequency in the conflict with al Qaeda as well as in
other low-intensity conflicts in Libya and Somalia. 8 Most of
these critics attribute this use to the political advantage
associated with a “no risk” war fought by invulnerable drone
operators who sit thousands of miles from the battlefield. 9 This
invulnerability creates a sense that such a conflict in which one
side does not risk its soldiers is “unfair ,” contributing to the
widespread negative perception of drones. Given all of these
negatives, why is drone use becoming more, rather than less
prevalent?
Why Are Drones Used?
Ironically the extensive use of drones has a great deal to
do with a different form of perceived “unfairness”, that posed
by asymmetric warfare to many of the world’s militaries during
the past few decades.
Asymmetric warfare is not new.
Conflicts involving two parties between which there is a large
disparity in the quantity and/or quality of military manpower
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pd
f.
6
Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International
Policies Faulted: Drone Strikes Widely Opposed, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 13,
2012), available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obamaslips-international-policies-faulted/ [hereinafter Pew Survey].
7
Murray Wardrop, Unmanned Drones Could be Banned, Says Senior Judge, THE
TELEGRAPH (July 6, 2009),,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/5755446/Unmanned-drones-couldbe-banned-says-senior-judge.html (quoting Lord Bingham, a retired senior law lord).
8
See Michael Georgy, U.S. Sends Drones to Libya, Battle Rages for Misrata,
REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/us-libyaidUSTRE7270JP20110421; see also Alex Spilius, Britain ‘Flew Drones Over Libya’,
THE TELEGRAPH (Jul. 26, 2012).
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/9430380/Brit
ain-flew-drones-over-Libya.html (indicating that the RAF used American-made
Predator drones over Libya).
9
See Notes 1–7 supra.
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and equipment have existed for centuries or even millennia. In
most cases the weaker irregular forces were either resisting an
army of occupation (e.g. the partisans that fought the Germans
in Yugoslavia during World War II or the Arab uprising against
the Turks lead by the British officer T.E. Lawrence during
World War I) or were internal insurgencies against the
government (e.g. the Vietcong in South Vietnam, the Tamil
Tigers in Sri Lanka or the FARC in Colombia). During the
past half century these asymmetric wars have resulted in one of
four outcomes; 1) military victory for the irregular forces after
the collapse of the government or the withdraw of government
troops from the contested region; 10 2) military defeat for the
irregular forces; 11 3) political accommodation between the two
sides; 12 or 4) continuing conflict. 13
The nature of transnational armed conflict, that is a
conflict between a state and an external non -state actor such as
the US versus al-Qaeda, makes many of these outcomes
virtually impossible. 14 Unless it redefines its goals, al Qaeda
cannot achieve a military victory because its current goals go
beyond merely expelling US forces from Iraq, Afghanistan or
Yemen and it has no way of threatening to topple the US
government. Similarly without changes in al Qaeda’s goals,
political accommodation is seemingly impossible because any
form of agreement between local al Qaeda organizations and
their “host” state will not end the conflict with the US. On the
other hand, the nature of al Qaeda and the lar ger context of the
10

E.g. The Vietcong and North Vietnam were victorious when the South
Vietnamese government fell; Mao’s Communist Chinese rebellion succeeded when it
pushed Chiang Kai-Shek’s government off the mainland to Taiwan; the Chechens were
victorious in the First Chechen War when Russia withdrew its troops from the region.
11
E.g. The Tamil Tigers were crushed by the Sri Lankan military in 2009; Russia
reasserted its military control over Chechnya after the Second Chechen War.
12
The IRA agreed to decommission its military arm and peacefully participate in
the political process.
13
The continuing conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC has
gone on for over 45 years.
14
See Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42
ISR. L. REV. 46, 50 (2009) (setting out the need for the law of armed conflict to evolve
to address the “emerging category” of “transnational armed conflict”).
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conflict between Islamic states and Israel means that any US
military victory depends heavily on the ability to disrupt and
destroy the capabilities of al Qaeda and its offshoots without
alienating the broader populations of nations wher e al Qaeda is
found.
Although asymmetric warfare is not new, the role that
law has played in asymmetric conflicts of the past thirty years
is. Human rights organizations and the UN now routinely
address the legality of actions undertaken by parties t o such
conflicts. These legal assessments can be as informal as a
single press release 15 or as formal as the reports of United
Nations official fact-finding missions from conflicts like the
ones in Gaza and Sri Lanka. 16 In addition two publications by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 and Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
under International Humanitarian Law have directly addressed
some of the more difficult legal questions associated with
asymmetric warfare. 18 As a result, the conduct of all armed
15

See e.g. Clive Baldwin, Syria is Bound by the Laws of War, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/09/syria-bound-laws-war;
see also Stephanie Nebehay, Red Cross Ruling Raises Question of Syrian War Crimes,
REUTERS (July 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/14/us-syria-crisisicrc-idUSBRE86D09H20120714.
16
See e.g. Rep. of the Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and
Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict, Sep. 25, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48; GAOR 12 th Sess.,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf
[hereinafter Goldstone Report]; see also Rep.of the Secretary-General’s Panel of
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, March 31, 2001,
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf [hereinafter Sri
Lanka Report].
17
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME 1: RULES 355
(Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds. 2005) [hereinafter Customary
IHL].
18
Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 997
(2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf,
[hereinafter Interpretive Guidance] (while neither the Interpretive Guidance nor
Customary International Humanitarian Law have the force of law because they cannot
become customary international law without opinio juris to support them, they both
strive to provide definitive answers to the questions of who may be targeted and when.
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conflicts, including asymmetric ones, is subjected to a great
deal more legal scrutiny than it was thirty years ago,
particularly with regard to limiting or avoiding civilian
casualties. The way that these legal assessments deal with the
thorniest questions raised by asymmetric warfare has been a
factor in the increasing reliance on armed drones.
Both sides in an asymmetric armed conflict have legal
responsibilities for avoiding harm to civilians. 19 On the one
hand, irregular armed groups are required to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population 20 and are prohibited
from using the civilian population to shield them from attack. 21
On the other hand, state militaries are prohibited from
conducting attacks that are expected to cause disproportionate
damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure in light of the
military advantage gained. 22 They are also required to take all
feasible precautions to prevent or minimize civilian casualties
and to provide warnings to the civilian population of imminent
attacks. 23
In practice, however, these have not been interpreted to
be reciprocal obligations. Determinations of whether irregular
armed groups improperly intermingled themselves with the
civilian population have turned not on their proximity to the
civilian population when they initiated offensive operations,
but rather on whether the armed groups subjectively “intended”
for the civilian population to act as a shield. 24 Absent evidence
that the fighters forced civilians to remain in proximity to the
The Interpretive Guidance also attempts to define the circumstances in which a civilian
forfeits their immunity from attack).
19
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
Art. 48, 51-58, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (although
Protocol I is technically applicable to only international armed conflicts, many of these
provisions concerning the protection of the civilian population are widely viewed as
customary law in non-international armed conflicts as well).
20
Id. Art. 48.
21
Id. Art. 51(7).
22
Id. Art. 51(5b).
23
Id. Art. 57.
24
See Goldstone Report 123; see also Sri Lanka Report 65.
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fighting, no violation was found. 25 Although the ICRC is clear
that the use of civilians as human shields is illegal, 26 its
analysis of human shielding situations insists that the “use of
civilians as human shields does not release the attacker from
his obligations with respect to the civilian population.” 27 In
other words the use of human shields by irregular armed groups
may be illegal, but it is also effective. Any attack on a
shielded target would be considered a violation of the laws of
war by an attacker if the attacker was aware of the shielding
and it produced disproportionate civilian casualties. Likewise
any attack that is not preceded an effective warning could also
be considered a violation if it resulted in civilian casualties that
could have been avoided if a more effective warning had been
given. 28 While it is unclear whether these interpretations of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL, the term used to describe
Geneva Convention law) are effective in reducing civilians
during an asymmetric armed conflict, 29 it is clear that honoring
25

Id.
See Customary IHL Rule 97; see also Interpretive Guidance 56-58 and Sri
Lanka Report 65.
27
Interpretive Guidance 57 fn. 142; see also Sri Lanka Report 65.
28
See Goldstone Report 130-33.
29
The legal concept that an attacker violates IHL if it causes civilian casualties
when attacking irregular armed forces that are intermingled with the civilian population
has the same intuitive appeal as the tort law doctrine of “last clear chance”. Both are
based upon the idea that a party that is capable of avoiding causing harm (be they
tortfeasor or attacker) should be legally required to do so. While the “last clear chance
doctrine” may have been appropriate for torts (although it has largely been supplanted
by comparative fault in most US jurisdictions) its application to IHL is much more
problematic because the victims (civilians) and wrongdoers (irregular armed groups)
are separate entities whereas in tort law they are one and the same person. Last clear
chance allowed a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover when a tortfeasor had a
final chance to avoid causing harm even though the victim contributed to the
occurrence which harmed him. Because it is unlikely that the victim benefited from
being harmed, allowing for compensation when the tortfeasor could have avoided
causing the harm seems appropriate. In IHL irregular armed groups are contributing to
the likelihood that civilians will be harmed by conducting operations in close proximity
to the civilian population. Because the irregular armed groups stand to benefit from
civilian casualties caused by strikes conducted by the state armed forces they oppose, it
is less clear that this interpretation of IHL is an effective or appropriate way to reduce
civilian casualties. Whether this interpretation of IHL can be viewed as incentivizing
(although not directly endorsing) the practice of irregular armed groups conducting
operations in close proximity to the civilian population, the appropriateness of this
interpretation from either a legal or policy standpoint is beyond the scope of this essay.
26
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these interpretations will alter the behavior of state armed
forces.
Because observing these restrictions when fighting an
enemy that conducts its operations in close proximity to the
civilian population effectively negates much of the firepower
advantage enjoyed by state armed forces , regular militaries
involved in asymmetric conflicts have reacted to the
restrictions in one of two ways. In several instances they have
virtually ignored the restrictions entirely employing artillery,
rocket launchers and bombers in assaults on irregular forces in
densely populated areas resulting in tens of thousands of
civilian casualties. 30 Alternatively, forces that attempted to
comply with these restrictions turned to t heir technological
advantage to find a solution to the problem posed by
asymmetric warfare and the laws that govern it.
If human shielding is deemed to be legally effective then
attacks had to become more discriminating, intelligence had to
be more accurate and the weapons employed had to become
much smaller than the ones designed to defeat a more
traditional military opponent. 31 It was in the gathering of real30

See Sri Lanka Report supra note 6, at 55-60, (the Sri Lankan military used a
great deal of heavy artillery in its final offensive against the Tamil Tigers in 2009 and
killed tens of thousands of civilians in doing so). See John Sweeney, Revealed:
Russia’s Worst War Crime in Chechnya, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2000),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/mar/05/russia.chechnya; see also Russian
Tanks Pounding Grozny from 3 Directions, NY TIMES (Dec. 18, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/18/world/russian-tanks-pounding-grozny-from-3directions.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/I/Immigration%20and%2
0Refugees (the Russian military used tanks, artillery and bombers extensively in their
assaults on the Chechen capital of Grozny during both the First (1994-95) and Second
(1999-2000) Chechen Wars resulting in tens of thousands of civilian casualties).
31
Compare. MK-82 General Purpose Bomb Specifications, GLOBAL
SECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk82specs.htm (stating that the Mark-82 bomb (the smallest of the munitions typically
employed by manned aircraft) with a total weight of ~500 lbs and a warhead weight of
192 lbs), with AGM-114 Hellfire Specifications, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/agm-114-specs.htm (noting
that the Hellfire missile that is the most frequently used drone launched munition with
a total weight of approximately 100 lbs and a warhead weight of ~35 pounds), and
AGM-114 Hellfire Specifications, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm (stating that the
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time intelligence that drones first made an appearance in the
conflict with al Qaeda.
Their exceptional endurance of
between 20 and 30 hours allowed for long loiter times over the
target which helped to accurately identify individual targets as
well as establishing their patterns of movement. 32 With the
exception of one strike in late 2002, 33 drones were used almost
exclusively in this role through the mid -2000’s. Over the four
years from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2007 armed
drones only conducted 9 strikes in Pakistan. 34
Weapons also got smaller and more precise.
The
standard laser guided bomb employed in the 1990’s and early
2000’s was the GBU-24, a 2,000 pound bomb with a 945 pound
warhead. In large part out of concern for reducing collateral
damage the mid-2000’s saw the introduction of a much smaller
smart bomb, the GBU-39 weighing only 250 lbs. with a
warhead of 50 lbs. 35
However, continuing criticisms of civilian casualties
caused by conventional airstrikes 36 and night raids by Special
Forces 37 in both Afghanistan and Pakistan continued to put
most common laser guided bomb dropped by manned aircraft is the 2,000 lb Paveway
with a 945 lb warhead, although the smaller GBU-39 was introduced in ~2006 with a
total weight of 250 lbs with a 50 lb warhead).
32
See Predator B UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS INC.,
http://www.ga-asi.com/ products/aircraft/predator_b.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2012);
see also Predator C Avenger UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS INC.,
http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_c.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2012).
33
See Drone Warfare: Are Strikes by Unmanned Aircraft Ethical?,CQ
RESEARCHER, Aug. 6, 2010 at 663, available at
http://www.asil.org/files/CQ_DroneWarfare.pdf.
34
Id. at 656.
35
See Id.
36
See generally Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in
Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0908web_0.pdf.
37
See Civil Liberties and National Security: Before the Subcommittee On The
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary House
of Representatives, 111th Cong. 77–78 (2010) (Prepared Testimony of Jeremy Scahill,
Correspondent, The Nation),; see also Alissa Rubin, US Transfers Control of Night
Raids to Afghanistan, NY TIMES, Apr. 8, 2012,at A1 (claiming that night raids were
also politically unpopular in Afghanistan because they violated the privacy of women
and children)..
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pressure on the United States to seek alternatives. Armed
drones offered the advantage of smaller weapons (Hellfire
missiles designed for use on helicopters) that weigh 100 lbs.
with a warhead of approximately 35 lbs. and real -time control
over firing decisions that special forces and conventional
aircraft could not offer. Although drones were also initially
criticized for causing civilian casualties 38 there was evidence
from the beginning that these were often based upon
exaggerated reports generated by the Taliban for political
purposes. 39 As time has gone on more careful studies on the
question of civilian casualties from drone strikes have been
conducted. These more objective assessments, along with
refinements in drone targeting such as targeting vehicles
instead of compounds to reduce the likelihood that family
members would be harmed, have made it widely accepted that
civilian casualties from drone strikes are very low. 40 So low in
fact, that there are serious questions now about whether drones
should be required to be used in many circumstances. 41
Like the early claims about civilian casualties, the
commonly heard criticism that armed drones bring a video
game mentality to warfare that makes drone operators less
likely to obey the laws of war or to understand the
38

See notes 1–7 supra.
See Kenneth Anderson, Am I Arguing a Strawman About Drones and Civilian
Casualties?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 27, 2011, 9:51 AM),,
http://volokh.com/2011/04/27/am-i-arguing-a-strawman-about-drones-and-civiliancasualties (arguing that the recent acknowledgement by many human rights advocates
of the superior target discrimination of drones does not alter the fact that many of the
early criticisms of drones were related to excessive civilian casualties; see also C.
Christine Fair, Drones Over Pakistan—Menace or Best Viable Option?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-christine-fair/drones-overpakistan----m_b_666721.html (arguing that reports by U.S. and Pakistani media
exaggerate civilian casualties caused by drones). See Farhat Taj, Drone Attacks:
Challenging Some Fabrications, DAILY TIMES (Jan. 2, 2010),
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C01%5C02%5Cstory_2-12010_pg3_5 (indicating that the U.S. and Pakistani media do not accurately report
civilian casualties caused by drone strikes).
40
Peter Bergen, Civilian Casualties Plummet in Drone Strikes, CNN.COM (July
14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/13/opinion/bergen-civiliancasualties/index.html.
41
Scott Shane, The Moral Case for Drones, NY TIMES, July 14, 2012,, at SR4..
39
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consequences of their actions has not stood up to serious
examination. The fact that drone operators are at risk for
PTSD and that in some cases they display greater levels of
combat stress than some units in Afghanistan is a strong
indication that this theoretical criticism is not a valid concern
in reality. 42
The one remaining common criticism of armed drone use
in transnational armed conflicts is that their use outside of “hot
battlefields” infringes upon the sovereignty of the nation in
which the strike takes place. The remainder of this essay
addresses that concern.
Where May Drones be Used?
The use of armed drones clarifies larger legal issues
concerning the boundaries of the battlefield in transnational
armed conflicts such as the one between the US and al Qaeda.
The reason why drones, rather than the other tools employed in
the conflict with al Qaeda, such as special forces, regular army,
FBI, or CIA, focus us in this way is because drones are
exclusively tools of armed conflict.
Armed drones may only legally be used in an armed
conflict (as opposed to law enforcement), and the reason for
this is that the dividing line between law enforcement and
armed conflict is based upon when and how lethal force can be
employed.
Lethal force during a time of armed conflict can be
applied against any positively identified enemy. The positively
identified enemy can be targeted whether they are dangerous or
not, whether they are armed or not, and whether they are awake
or not. The only restrictions against targeting a positively
42

See Elisabeth Bumiller, Air Force Drone Operators Report High Levels of
Stress, NY TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at A8; see also Interview with P.W. Singer: The
Soldiers Call it War Porn, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-defense-expert-p-w-singerthe-soldiers-call-it-war-porn-a-682852.html (indicating that drone operators suffer
from higher levels of combat stress and PTSD than do some units in the field).

DRONES AND TRANSNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

11

identified enemy are if they are inca pacitated or have
surrendered. 43
In law enforcement, the only time lethal force can be
employed is if the target is an imminent threat to law
enforcement or others and an opportunit y to surrender has been
offered.
Because drones cannot offer an opportunity to
surrender before employing lethal force they may not be used
in a law enforcement environment and are may only be
employed in times of armed conflict. This means that when
there are drone strikes in Yemen or in Pakistan, the legal basis
for them being used must be a belief that the laws of armed
conflict apply rather than laws governing law enforcement.
The argument that law enforcement rules, rather than the
laws of armed conflict should apply outside of “hot
battlefields” has been advanced by those who oppose strikes in
places like Yemen and Pakistan. These opponents contend that
there is no war going on in Yemen, or at least that there was no
war going on in Yemen a year and a half ago when the United
States first began targeting Anwar Al-Awlaki in that nation. 44
Likewise they argue that there is no war going on in the FATA
areas of Pakistan, and because of that the laws of armed
conflict do not apply there, drone strikes are illegal in that area
as well.
This geographically minimalist argument that seeks to
strictly limit the boundaries of the battlefield in conflicts like
the one between the U.S. and al Qaeda, is based on the
43

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
August 2, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
44
Note that al-Awlaki’s name is also transliterated al-Aulaqi, Complaint, AlAulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C 2010) (No. 10-01469) (the complaint filed
in 2010 contended on 17 separate occasions in 11 pages that the targeting of al-Aulaqi
was occurring “outside of armed conflict”); see also O’Connell testimony, note 3 supra
(O’Connell maintains that there is no armed conflict in the border regions of Pakistan
either).
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description of the boundaries in the battlefield in non international armed conflicts. There are two kinds of armed
conflict, international armed conflicts (IAC’s) and noninternational conflicts (NIAC’s). 45
International armed
conflicts are easy to identify because they involve two
countries, for example France versus Germany. However,
determining the boundaries of the battlefield in noninternational armed conflicts is more difficult because of the
nature of the conflict and the fact that one of the participants is
a non-state actor. The Tadic opinion 46 from the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) dealt with that issue,
when it determined the geography in which the laws armed
conflict applied within the former Yugoslavia. This opinion
demonstrated an understandable hesitancy in applying the laws
of armed conflict throughout an entire nation that is undergoing
an internal conflict for the entire length of that conflict.
Because the laws of armed conflict allow actions whose
application should be limited, such as targeting based upon
positive identification rather than dangerousness and indefinite
detention without charge there is an obvious desire to limit the
geography in which such rules apply. Therefore the ICTY
sought to curb the geographical and temporal scope of the laws
of armed conflict in Tadic.
The Tadic court applied the law of armed conflict only
in the geographic areas where there existed a threshold level of
45

See Geneva I and Geneva 3, art. 3 (all four Geneva Conventions contain
identical article 3’s, often termed “common article 3”. Common article 3 describes the
application of the Geneva Conventions to the two types of armed conflicts. The
difference between these two types of conflicts is more fully described by the 1977
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Compare Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I] (addressing international armed conflicts), with Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1987) [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (addressing noninternational armed conflicts).
46
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,¶¶ 561–62
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (“[A]n armed conflict exists
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State.”).
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violence and a level of cohesion in the actors fighting each
other. If this approach was applied to countries such as Yemen
where (until recently) there was no armed conflict because the
level of violence threshold was not met , then one would
conclude that the tools of armed conflict could not be used
there.
The sensibilities that underlie this idea are not new and
can be traced all the way back to our own civil war, which
occurred long before any of these concepts were debated on an
international level.
In ex Parte Milligan, 47 a Southern
sympathizer was captured in Indiana by Union forces. He was
tried by a military commission and sentenced to death. He
appealed on the grounds that he should have been afforded trial
before an article 3 court rather than a military commission and
the United States Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court
reasoned that one may not try a Southern sympathizer before a
military commission in Indiana if the civilian courts were open
and available at the time. In places where the institutions of
civil society were still functioning, even though there was
unquestionably a rebellion going on, those institutions of civil
society must be used. The result may have been quite different
in Tennessee where the Union was acting as an occupying army
and as such it was temporarily providing the institutions of
civil society. But in Indiana, the courts were open and so the
laws of armed conflict should not be applied in that area
because they need not be applied there.
For internal NIAC’s this reasoning that underlay
Milligan and Tadic makes perfect sense. However, applying
this reasoning to transnational armed conflicts is far more
problematic. The problem with using the Tadic factors to
define the boundaries of the battlefield in such conflicts is that
doing so essentially turns the Geneva Conventions on their
head.

47

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 4 (1866) (requiring that even during time of
rebellion civilian courts be utilized instead of military commissions in geographical
areas where the courts were functioning).
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In order to understand why this happens, one has to have
a basic understanding of the primary purpose of the Geneva
Convention and how the Conventions look at the world.
Geneva divides the world into two groups, combatants and
civilians. 48 Combatants are not just people that pick up guns,
but rather people that belong to an organization that enforces
the laws of war. It is through the definition of combatancy that
the laws of war encourage people to follow the laws of war.
U.S. soldiers are combatants because they go to jail if they
violate the laws of armed conflict in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Because the United States enforces the laws of war, its soldiers
are combatants.
The advantage of being a combatant is that they are
entitled to the combatant’s privilege, which means that
combatants are not legally liable for the harm and destruction
they cause as long as they complied with the laws of war. For
example, if a combatant blows up a building and hurts the
people in the building, he cannot be charged with assault,
arson, murder, etc. if the attack was conducted in keeping with
the laws of war. The disadvantage of being a combatant is that
they are targetable 24/7 because of their status as an identified
enemy.
Everyone that is not a combatant is a civilian. 49 The
advantage of being a civilian is that they are never
targetable under any circumstances. The disadvantage is
that civilians are not allowed to participate in armed
conflict and if they do so they forfeit the immunity that
48

It should be noted that the ICRC document does not have the force of law and
can only become customary international law if its parameters are accepted by a
number of states. Because military reaction to the Interpretive Guidance has contended
that the definitions offered are too narrow (i.e., that the ICRC considers that fewer
people and fewer actions constitute direct participation in hostilities than the military
might), the Interpretive Guidance should be viewed as a baseline description of
behavior that inarguably constitutes direct participation in hostilities while the actual
state of the law remains less clear. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally
Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010) (criticizing the ICRC’s approach to
direct participation in hostilities in Part IX of the Interpretive Guidance).
49
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE at 997.
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comes with being a civilian. When a civilian picks up a
gun and starts firing, they lose their immunity. They can
regain their immunity by putting their gun down and
ceasing to participate in hostilities . Some civilians that
continue in the revolving door between fighter by night
and farmer by day, or actively perform leadership roles
are termed continuous combat functionaries and they
become targetable 24/7 just as though they were a
combatant. This permanent loss of civilian immunity is
based upon the function that the civilian performs within
an armed group.
In this way IHL provides that if someone is functioning
like a combatant, then they may be targeted like a combatant. 50
However, even if they may be targeted like a combatant they
are not entitled to the combatant’s privilege, because they are
still considered to be civilians directly participating in
hostilities. They do not belong to an organization that enforces
the laws of war, therefore they cannot be combatants. This is
how IHL deals with groups such as al Qaeda. It denies them
the combatant’s privilege, but it permits the continuous
targeting of active members of such groups that perform
combatant functions. The only way someone in a group like al
Qaeda can regain their civilian immunity is to get away from al
Qaeda and definitively disassociate themselves from the group.
The problem with using the Tadic factors to determine
the geographical scope of a transnational armed conflict is that
it gives al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations another way
to effectively regain their civilian immunity.
By simply
crossing the border into Pakistan, or going to Yemen, or to
Somalia, or Sudan, places where law enforcement is not
effective, and where the threshold of violence required by
Tadic is not present an al Qaeda member could effectively
regain their civilian immunit y.
This is because the
geographical minimalist view that applies the Tadic factors
would consider the lack of local violence to mean that the laws
50

INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE at 993-96, 1031-33.
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of armed conflict would not apply in those areas and the tools
of law enforcement would be the exclusive met hod by which
these terrorists could be pursued. The idea that IHL should be
interpreted in this manner, resulting in one of IHL’s least
favored groups (terrorists that target civilians and hide amongst
the civilian population) being afforded this kind of sanctuary
seems contrary to the core principles of IHL.
The alternative to applying Tadic to transnational armed
conflicts is to apply the neutrality law principles that have
determined the boundaries of the battlefield in IAC’s for
centuries, and it appears that this is what the US is doing.
While the US position is far from definitive about its legal
rationale for employing drones, it is possible to cobble together
the speeches of various administration officials from the past
couple of years (Koh at ASIL a couple of years ago, Brennan at
Harvard last September and Holder at Northwestern in April) 51
and get a feel for how the administration views this issue.
What they appear to be doing and the norm I believe they are
effectively creating is that the boundaries of the battlefield in
transnational armed conflicts will be determined by a modified
version of centuries-old neutrality law.
The law of neutrality has been used to determine the
boundaries of the battlefield and the rights and obligations of
nations involved in IAC’s for over a century. 52 During a
conflict between state A and state B where some of A’s forces
take refuge in or use a neutral state as a base of operations that
neutral state has an obligation to remove A’s forces from its
territory. When state B demands that this removal take place,
the neutral state has three choices i n response. It can become
an ally of B and allow B’s forces onto its territory to go after
A’s forces, it can become an enemy of B by preventing B’s
forces from entering its territory and harboring A’s forces, or it
can remain neutral by denying B’s forces the right to enter
while expelling A’s forces from its territory.
51

Speeches on file with law review.
See Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land arts. 1–5, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter
Hague V] (establishing the inviolate nature of neutral territory for belligerents).
52
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The conflict between the U.S. and al Qaeda has
displayed all three of these choices i n its application of
neutrality law principles to a transnational armed conflict. The
first example occurred when the United States approached
Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 and demanded the
expulsion of Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and others.
Afghanistan acted as an enemy of the U.S. by refusing to
discharge its neutral obligations and harboring bin Laden and
other al Qaeda members within its borders. As a result, when
the U.S. invaded Afghanistan to pursue al Qaeda it also
attacked the Taliban because they effectively became the
enemy by harboring al Qaeda. The second example is that of
Yemen when the U.S. approached it over al Qaeda’s presence
within its borders. Yemen chose to act as an ally of the United
States, and (as WikiLeaks has made clear) granted permission
for the U.S. to use armed force on its territory. With this
permission the U.S. has conducted numerous drone strikes on
Yemeni territory since 2002, including the one that killed
Anwar al-Awlaki last September. The third example is when
states retain their neutral status by denying the U.S. permission
to employ armed force on their territory while discharging their
neutral obligations by expelling or arresting al Qaeda members
within their borders. Numerous European states have taken
this approach by either detaining suspected al Qaeda members
themselves or allowing U.S. law enforcement to apprehend al
Qaeda members on their territory.
The most widely analyzed event in the conflict with al
Qaeda of the past few years (the killing of Osama bin Laden by
U.S. Special Forces in Pakistan) also fits within this
framework. Pakistan had clearly acted as an ally of the U.S. on
a number of occasions by giving the U.S. permission to use
force on its territory, either in the form of drone strikes or
special forces missions. However, there were also ways that
Pakistan had acted as an enemy toward the U.S. by failing to
make any effort to detain or expel al Qaeda members from its
territory. The fact that bin Laden had lived undisturbed within
a few miles of Pakistan’s military academy was viewed as
evidence that Pakistan was either unab le or unwilling to
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apprehend or expel bin Laden. The U.S. viewed this failure by
Pakistan to discharge its neutral obligations as the basis for
using armed force on Pakistani territory without Pakistani
permission.
In conclusion, the state practice of the United States in
the conflict with al Qaeda appears to rely on the application of
neutrality law principles in determining the boundaries of the
battlefield. This is borne out by the way in which the U.S. has
employed armed drones, which are exclusively tools of armed
conflict, in areas outside of “hot battlefields”. When compared
with the competing vision of the boundaries of the battlefield
offered by the “geographic minimalists” that applies the Tadic
factors to transnational armed conflicts, it becomes clear that
relying upon neutrality law principles for determining the
scope of transnational armed conflicts is more in keeping with
the core principles of IHL.

